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Designing Free Software Samples: 








We develop a vertical differentiation game-theoretic model that addresses the issue of 
designing free software samples (shareware) for attaining follow-on sales. When 
shareware can be reinstalled, cannibalization of sales of the commercial product may 
ensue. We analyze the optimal design of free software according to two characteristics: 
the evaluation period allotted for sampling (potentially renewable) and the proportion of 
features included in the sample. We introduce a new software classification scheme based 
on the characteristics of the sample that aid consumer learning. We find that the optimal 
combination of features and trial time greatly depends on the category of software within 
the classification scheme. Under alternative learning scenarios, we show that the 
monopolist may be better off not suppressing potential shareware reinstallation. 
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  1I. Introduction 
There are several reasons why firms give away free samples of their products.  Some firms offer 
free samples to raise the cost of switching to competing products, others attempt to leverage 
possible network effects or sell up-grades or complementary products. However, going back to 
the roots of traditional marketing, a primary purpose of offering free samples is to enhance sales 
by providing first-hand experience to users (Belch and Belch (1990)). Specifically, a sample 
allows the consumer to learn about the product.
1 When the learning experience is positive it 
usually results in increased sales. 
In this paper, we analyze the case of a company that sells information products and gives 
away free software samples in order to build product awareness and attain follow-on sales. These 
information products include mass consumer software and typically are single-user applications 
deployed on non-networked devices. Some examples include computer games, music/photo/art 
software, spreadsheets, word-processors, and web-design and business application software. For 
many of these products, distributing shareware is the most widely used marketing method (Choi 
et al. (1997)). Moreover, the value of these products’ intrinsic features becomes more evident via 
using the sample. 
By contrast, free samples such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and MS PowerPoint viewer are 
designed mainly to take advantage of the network effects stemming from a large installed 
customer base (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). These network effects can be regarded as extrinsic 
features of the product. Our focus is on the intrinsic features of software products for which 
network effects are not necessarily the dominant factor. 
                                                           
1 Learning can be broadly defined here as acquiring information about previously unknown characteristics of the 
product, or learning how to use the product in an effective manner (i.e. training). 
  2The nature of traditional physical samples differs from that of information products such as 
software. Typically, a physical sample provides a limited experience of the actual product. Even 
in the case of a durable good like an automobile, a sample in the form of a test drive gives an 
experience of the majority of features that the customer needs, but only for a limited time. 
However, in the case of shareware, the consumer can often reinstall the sample on a repeated 
basis, especially when the sample offers the product’s most useful features. In that instance, the 
distribution of free samples leads to sales cannibalization.
2
Consequently, the sample evaluation period, which controls the frequency of reinstallation 
and the proportion of features included in the sample are critical characteristics for the design of 
free software.
3 RealOne player is an example where the software’s free basic version comes with 
limited functionality and the company periodically posts intrusive messages on the computer 
desktop urging the consumer to purchase the unrestricted version. Other pieces of software like 
Adobe Photoshop run out after 30 days of free trial. Although many shareware come with these 
restrictions, an adept user can in many instances, reinstall the free version anew by uninstalling 
the previous version and setting the counter back to zero. This activity is generally considered a 
form of piracy.
4
Here, we examine how a monopolist optimally designs free software samples. We address the 
issue of sales cannibalization while focusing on the intrinsic features of the software product. 
                                                           
2 The issue of product sales cannibalization is also studied in Takeyama (2002). She shows that a durable-good 
monopolist may indeed choose to cannibalize its own high-end product by offering goods of lesser quality, which 
results in a consumer welfare improving equilibrium. Haruvy and Prasad (2001) analyze sales cannibalization in the 
context of network effects. They find that when software products benefit from network effects, these effects may 
play a role in mitigating the cannibalization of sales. However, they do not consider the case of network effects 
having an adverse impact on sales. In particular, a large base of free software users may create an incentive for 
newcomers to keep using the free sample rather than buying the actual product. 
3 Cakanyildirim and Dalgic (2001) study demonstration strategies that promote information products. The strategic 
variables used in their model are demo features and the length of the demo phase. Heiman and Muller (2001) show 
how the demonstration phase may vary in length depending on how competitive the industry is, and depending on 
whether the demonstration is personalized or not. 
  3Consumers learn about the product and may then decide to purchase the product or continue to 
use the sample by circumventing the evaluation period restriction. An obvious application of our 
model is to B2C or B2B mass consumer markets that offer shareware. However, our model also 
covers specialized markets such as industrial software. 
We introduce a new software classification scheme based on shareware characteristics, which 
helps consumers assess the novelty and performance of the product as well as other key 
properties such as ease of use. For each category of software, we identify the optimal 
combination of trial time and proportion of features to be included in the free samples. Our 
results are confirmed by actual marketing practices of software vendors. Marketing managers 
can also use this classification scheme as a normative guide for the design of new shareware. 
Furthermore, we show that when consumers’ learning happens in stages, it may be beneficial 
for the monopolist not to deter reinstallation. The reason is that by keeping the initial trial time 
short, revenues can be extracted faster from the segment of consumers that are willing to buy at 
the early stage, while generating additional revenues from the consumers who take longer to 
develop an appreciation for the product. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the game theoretic 
model. Section III introduces a new software classification scheme based on the key parameters 
of the model. Section IV presents the main propositions describing the game’s equilibria under 
the base case scenario about learning. Section V extends the model to multi-period learning. Our 
concluding comments appear in Section VI. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Software & Information Industry Association’s website at http://www.siia.net/piracy/. 
  4II.  The Basic Model 
We use a vertical differentiation game-theoretic model (Tirole, 1988). In a vertical 
differentiation framework, consumers differ according to their reservation prices but have a 
unanimous preference ranking over the product’s quality/attributes. Hence, the producer’s 
objective is not only to determine the optimal price, but also to select the optimal 
quality/attributes of his product as well, since these attributes drive demand.
5
This framework is well suited for studying the decision of offering free software samples 
alongside a commercial product. In practice, choosing the attributes of a software sample is a 
non-trivial task, since 1) software samples are in many instances durable goods, and 2) sample 
attributes may cannibalize the sales of the commercial product when too many of the product’s 
features are included in the sample.
6 We assert that the proportion of features included in the 
sample and the evaluation period together help the consumer learn about the characteristics of 
the actual product. Hence, modeling the consumer’s learning process plays a key role in our 
analysis. 
The software industry is generally concentrated. For example in 2005, the top two companies 
in the desktop application industry represented about 82% of the industry’s revenues.
7 This is 
because the up-front cost of developing software products is prohibitively high. Presumably, 
product design is mainly achieved via R&D-related expenditures (fixed costs) with little to no 
increase in marginal cost. We adopt a monopolistic market structure for our model, since our 
                                                           
5 For a good introduction on vertical product differentiation, see Sutton (1986). 
6 Coase (1972) and Stokey (1981) are the classic articles regarding the analysis of the standard durable good 
monopolist.  More recently, Dhebar (1994) studies how the speed of improvement of the intrinsic quality of 
software (or other durable good products) affects the dynamics of sales. 
7 Source: “Scale or Scope: that is the M&A Question in Software”, Deloitte Consulting, 2005. 
  5primary goal is to analyze the optimal design of free samples within the simplest framework that 
captures market concentration. 
The basic model consists of a two-stage sequential game with imperfect information about the 
product. The game tree is described in Figure 1 and all the notations used in the basic model are 
summarized in Table 1 below. There are two categories of players: a monopolist and a 
population of consumers. Figure 1 depicts the game tree and the payoffs for a consumer and the 
monopolist. A standard game period, normalized to one, is interpreted as the industry standard 
for the maximum duration of time a consumer is allowed to use a free sample.
8 In stage 0, the 
monopolist chooses the commercial product’s price P, and decides whether to offer a free sample 
or not. This stage is instantaneous. Next, Stage 1 has an infinite number of periods. Introducing 
an infinite number of periods is a useful device to account for the durable nature of digital goods. 
The consumer’s strategic move occurs either at the beginning or at the end of period 1, as shown 
in Figure 1. During the remaining periods (2 to ∞), the consumer is passive and draws utility 
following her strategic move in period 1. 
At the beginning of Stage 1 (and period 1), a consumer may decide to buy (B) or not to buy 
(Not-B) the product, when the monopolist has not offered a free sample. On the other hand, when 
a free sample is offered, a consumer evaluates the sample in period 1 and then makes a decision. 
In that case, we refer to period 1 as the learning period. The rationale for modeling consumer 
behavior that way, is that sampling before buying is a widespread practice regarding information 
goods, since free samples are easily obtainable and evaluation periods are relatively short. 
Moreover, vendors tend to distribute free samples to the segment of consumers who are expected 
not to buy the product right away.  
  6 
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TABLE 1: Notations for the Basic Model 
Symbol Description 
N  Size of the market (population size). 
θ  Prior reservation price/Preference parameter. θ  LH   [θ ;θ ] ∈ . 
t0; 1  Minimum and maximum evaluation periods within one game period. 
s0; 1  Minimum and maximum proportions of features made available in sample. 
d  Utility reduction parameter due to sample reinstallation. d   [0;1] ∈ . 
A  Maximum learning effect on the reservation price after period 1. A>0. 
α  Marginal effect on learning of additional features included in the sample.   
δ  Consumer’s discount rate  .    [0;1) ∈
δm Monopolist’s discount rate  .   [0;1) ∈
c
  Marginal cost of producing one copy of the commercial software product. 
γ  Fraction of the cost of distributing of copies of the full commercial product’s to measure the sample’s 
distribution cost. γ      [0;1] ∈
F  Fixed cost of producing commercial product and sample. 
P  Price of the commercial software product. 
s, t  Free sample attributes: respectively the proportion of features and trial time. 
U  Direct period-wise utility from using the sample. 
V  Learning factor that impacts the reservation price θ. It is a function of s and t. 
ΠB Monopolist’s profit when consumer samples and then buys the product. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 In extensive form game terminology, a stage is a collection of periods defined by which player’s turn it is to play 
strategically. 
  7 
At the end of period 1, a consumer faces the decision to buy (B) or not to buy (Not-B) the 
commercial product. A third option for the consumer is to not buy the product and continue 
using the sample as a substitute for the product itself (reinstall the sample).
9 From period 2 on, 
she receives an infinite stream of utility payoffs either from the product if she buys or from 
reinstalling the sample. Not buying brings zero utility. Payoffs are present values of future 
expected utilities discounted as of the beginning of Stage 1. 
2.1- The Consumer 
A consumer’s utility depends on the attributes of the software she is using. A free sample is a 
version of the commercial product that is scaled down along two dimensions: the proportion of 
features s available in the free sample and the evaluation period (or trial time) t. Both variables s 
and t take values in the unitary interval [0,1]. For example, the trial version of Scientific Word is 
crippled (saving function unavailable) compared to the full-blown version, and the evaluation 
period is 30 days. 
It is important to emphasize that the sample serves a dual purpose for the consumer. First, as a 
scaled down version of the commercial product it provides direct utility from straight use. The 
second function of the sample is to enable the consumer to learn about the scope and 
performance of the product. A simple analogy is that a digital movie clip serves as a sample for 
the full-length movie DVD. Consumers may enjoy watching the clip for its own sake, but it also 
conveys information about what is to be expected in the full-length feature. 
                                                           
9 To simplify the analysis we assume that while the consumer tests the sample during the evaluation period, which 
could be less than the full game period; she makes his decision to buy (or not to buy) the product or re-use the 
sample only at the end of period 1. In Section V, we examine other types of learning processes, which may result in 
different segments of consumers buying in different periods. 
  8Learning can take several forms: consumers may use the sample as a training device to 
operate the product and they may as well discover features of the software, which are novel to 
them. In our framework, learning is modeled as an updating of the consumers’ prior valuation of 
the product, based on receiving new information from the sample. 







for s>0 and t>0; U=0 otherwise. Each consumer has a preference parameter θ   that 
represents her prior reservation price for the product in the absence of learning. This parameter 
is uniformly distributed according to Ψ(θ)






= . The utility function U depends on the 
proportion of features s included in the sample and the trial time (evaluation period) t.
10 Our 
formulation captures the reasonable property that consumers derive “more utility” from the 
proportion of features than trial time. Specifically, in instances where the evaluation period may 
be short, consumers still derive a high level of utility when the sample includes a large 
proportion of features. By contrast, consumers generally derive little utility from a sample 
having a small proportion of features, even though a long evaluation period may be given. While 
using the sample in period 1, consumers learn about the product, its performance and its intrinsic 
quality. We assume that learning raises the reservation price θ by a multiplicative variable V, 
which is referred to as the learning function:
11
 
                                                           
10 Note that the one-period utility obtained from using the full commercial version is θ since the commercial product 
provides all the features (s =1) and gives the full trial time (t =1). However, a consumer may still face a time 
constraint, even though full features and full trial time are being given to him. This time constraint arises from the 
effort the consumer must spend in reinstalling the sample, as we will see later. 
11 Our characterization of learning is congruent with Heiman and Muller’s (1996) approach. They argue that 
demonstrations (length or trial time) reduce the purchasing risk and thus possibly increase the probability of 
  9 
1, when s<s0 or t<t0 
V =
  () A( 1 ) st αα +− + 1 , when s0≤ s≤ 1 and t0≤ t≤ 1 
The function V depends on the proportion of features and trial time as well. As long as s and t 
are below their respective minima s0 and t0, the sample is deemed uninformative and the prior 
reservation price for the commercial product does not change. However, when s and t are above 
their respective minima, learning occurs and the updated reservation price rises. The parameter 
A is assumed positive. The parameter α ∈ [0,1] represents the impact that the proportion of 
features has on the learning process relative to trial time. The function V is essentially a 
mechanism that updates the prior reservation price θ based on new information received from 
trying the free sample. 
Let us now describe the consumers’ payoffs. As Figure 1 indicates, consumers make their first 
possible strategic move in Stage 1, at the beginning of period 1. At that point, they know their 
prior reservation price θ for the product. Thus, the one-period expected utility from purchasing 
the product is θ, since no new information about the product is acquired. In that case a 
consumer’s dynamic payoff from buying the product right away is the present value of expected 
utilities from the product minus the price paid δθ/(1-δ)-P if she buys, and 0 otherwise; where the 
parameter 0≤δ<1 denotes the consumers discount rate.
12
On the other hand, when the monopolist offers a free sample, consumers use the free sample 
and learn about the commercial product and hence their prior reservation price θ will be updated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
purchase at any given price. In our model, the likelihood of purchase is impacted not only by trial time but also by 
the sample’s features. 
  10at the end of period 1. Therefore, after using the sample with a given trial time and proportion of 
features, the total payoff for a consumer is: δU-δP+θVδ
2/(1-δ). This payoff comprises of the 
discounted direct utility δU of using the free sample in period 1; minus the discounted price of 
the product δP; plus the expected present value of future utilities from owning the commercial 
product θVδ
2/(1-δ); given that learning has raised the reservation price to θV in each subsequent 
periods of Stage 1.
13
Once a consumer has evaluated the sample, he may choose not to buy the product and to 
reinstall the sample for further use. Her total expected payoff becomes: δU+dUVδ
2/(1-δ). In this 
case, the payoff is comprised of the discounted direct utility from trying the sample δU during 




The parameter 0≤d≤1 represents a scaling factor that reduces the utility of re-using the 
sample. The main reason for including this parameter is that in general a software developer will 
take steps to minimize the unfettered reinstallation of his free sample. Thus, consumers must 
exert some effort to reinstall the sample in any given period.
15 A smaller value for d means a 
greater amount of effort and hence a greater reduction in the consumer’s utility. The parameter d 
is treated as exogenous here, although in practice a monopolist may optimally choose to make 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 Recall that the utility for the commercial product θ is obtained at the end of each game period. 
13 In the unlikely instance where the monopolist would give out the full-blown version of the product as the sample, 
we observe that the utility from buying the product outright is less than that of evaluating the sample and then 
buying. The main reason for that difference is that expected payoffs are updated based on new information in the 
latter case. On the other hand, if there were perfect information about the product, no updating would take place and 
the two cases would yield the same payoff. 
14 Note that the learning function V is assumed to also affect the utility obtained from reinstalling the sample, since 
the consumer may develop a greater appreciation for the sample itself, once the learning period is completed. 
15 It is important to note that in our framework when the monopolist gives the full commercial product as a free 
sample (s =1, t =1) with no reinstallation restriction (d =1), demand collapses and the price is zero. However, in the 
case where d =1, we recognize that trial time is actually of no consequence for the consumer. This boundary case 
  11the reinstallation procedure hard. Preventing reinstallation can take several forms. Some 
common forms involve including anti-piracy code in the sample and/or obtaining ID keys online 
from the monopolist. In the case where the commercial software product is highly technical and 
specialized, preventing reinstallation is also achievable via human monitoring. 
2.2- The Monopolist 
Similar to the vertical differentiation model presented in Tirole (1988), the monopolist faces a 
demand D(P,s,t) = N [1 - Ψ (θ(P,s,t))], where N is the size of the total customer market and P is 
the product price. The demand is constituted by the segment of consumers whose preference 
parameter  θ is greater than a threshold θ(P,s,t) determined by the strategic response of 
consumers to the monopolist’s decisions. 
We posit that the monopolist is developing the sample in conjunction with the commercial 
version of the software product. The monopolist’s profit is given by Π= D(P,s,t)×[P-c] – F - Nγc.  
The parameter c represents the marginal cost of producing copies of the commercial product. 
The parameter F is the fixed cost tied to research and development and the design of both the 
product and sample. This fixed cost is assumed independent of the particular proportion of 
features or amount of trial time included in the sample. 
The other fixed cost Nγc is associated with producing and distributing copies of the free 
sample to the entire population; where 0≤γ ≤1 is a scaling parameter. For example, the 
monopolist could mail free CDs to the population (e.g. AOL). This latter cost represents a 
fraction of what the cost of producing and distributing commercial copies to the whole 
population would be. Obviously, this cost is zero if no samples are made and distributed. It can 
also be negligible if the marginal cost c is near zero, for example, when shareware is distributed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
can be easily accommodated by modifying the sample’s definition to state that the minimum trial time t0 is always 1 
  12electronically over the internet. Lastly, when the monopolist offers a free sample, his profit is 
postponed to the end of period 1 and thus his profit is discounted at the rate 0≤δm<1. A large 
value of δm implies that the monopolist is patient, and vice versa. 
III. A New Software Classification Scheme 
In this section, we introduce a new software classification scheme based on the characteristics of 
the shareware.
16 Why focus on the shareware characteristics and not directly on those of the 
actual software product? The reason is that trial time and proportion of features are choice 
variables for the monopolist in a sample. These variables give a software vendor the latitude to 
demonstrate the properties of the software and thus provide surrogate measures for key 
characteristics of the commercial product. 
For example, consumers can assess whether the product is simple or complex to operate, 
based on how much minimum time is needed to reach basic proficiency in operating the product. 
This property is naturally reflected in the sample design. Consumers can also evaluate whether 
functionalities are mostly integrated or can be operated in independent modules. This second 
property is reflected in the minimal proportion of features included in the sample to facilitate 
learning. Moreover, the degree of novelty inherent in the software is reflected by the impact that 
the sample has on the consumers’ reservation prices.
17
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when d =1. 
16 Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) also introduce a classification scheme for information product design. They 
classify information goods as strategic complements or substitutes according to their ability to generate network 
externalities.  
17 Furthermore, all these characteristics are of interest to the consumer mainly prior to the purchase decision. Once 
the product is purchased it is too late so to speak, since consumers must now contend with the difficulties of 
learning how to operate the product. Tests featured in consumer magazines are another way to reveal some of the 
products characteristics to prospective buyers. 
  13Our classification scheme is based on the parameters of the learning function V introduced 
earlier.
18 We first differentiate between basic and complex software. Software is qualified as 
basic when the minimum evaluation period t0 needed to preview the product is small; and vice 
versa for a complex product. Software is referred to as modular when the minimum proportion of 
features s0 necessary for learning about the software is small. For example, free samples of a 
multilevel game do not usually include all the levels of play. On the other hand, software is 
defined as integrated when the sample requires most of the product’s features be included (s0 
large), for example as in the case of a CAD program. 
We define a conventional software product as one where sample use does not result in 
significant learning (A small); that is, posterior expectations about the value of the product do 
not rise dramatically after sample use, holding other parameters constant. On the other hand, we 
define novel software as one where sample use significantly enhances the reservation price (A 
large), by demonstrating the product’s novel features and valuable attributes. For example, web-
based business software may contain several features whose novelty can only be appreciated via 
sample use. 
Lastly, we recognize that individual features of software products may impact consumers’ 
perceived value with various levels of intensity. We differentiate between software products that 
are characterized by high-intensity features (α high) versus low-intensity features (α low). High-
intensity software products contain individual features that have high marginal contribution and 
are critical to achieving the purpose of the software. For example, antivirus or antispyware 
software would belong in this category, since each feature (scan, quarantine, auto-protect, etc…) 
contributes significantly to the overall purpose of the software. 
                                                           
18 This classification is not exclusively tied to the specific functional form we used to model learning, since the 
  14By contrast, several features embedded in word processors (strikethrough, font color, etc…) 
could be viewed as low-intensity features, since such features, although essential, are not critical 
for the core purpose of the product. Table 2 below presents the classification scheme by 














Low-Intensity High-Intensity Low-Intensity High-Intensity
 (α low)  (α high)  (α low)  (α high)
Basic Drawing/Painting Music creation Word processor CAD
 (t0 low) Basic calculator Educational Basic photo-editing Utilities software
Complex Spreadsheet Statistics/optimization Business accounting Tax software
 (t0 high) Personal money Engineering software Data mining SAP
Basic Multilevel games Educational Photo editing Antivirus/spyware
 (t0 low) Website design Utilities software
Complex Web-fulfillment Stock trading Supply chain mngt. Plant software
 (t0 high) Engineering software
Table 2: Software Classification Scheme
Conventional (A low)
Modular (s0 low) Integrated (s0 high)
Novel (A high)
IV. Equilibrium Analysis of the Basic Model 
This section presents the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of the basic game. The following 
propositions describe the monopolist’s optimal decision whether to offer a free sample or not. 
When a free sample is offered, we analyze the optimal design of the free sample according to our 
software classification scheme given in Table 2. We focus on pure strategy equilibria, which 
involve a segment of consumers buying the product either right away if no free sample is given, 
or buying the product after trying the sample if one is given. However, it is important to first 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
parameters have very natural and general interpretations. 
  15show that no Subgame Perfect equilibrium exists where consumers would commit to buy the 
product right away even when a free sample is being offered. 
Proposition 1: (Sampling before buying) Assume that consumers commit to buy the product 
right away at the beginning of period 1 (Stage1), then the monopolist should not offer any free 
sample. 
 
Proof: If consumers commit to buying the product right away, they must be indifferent between 
receiving a free sample or not. Thus, the monopolist should not offer a free sample, since in 
doing so his profit will be larger as he will not incur the manufacturing and distribution costs of 
the sample. QED 
Thus, the only possible equilibrium where consumers buy the product right away is one where 
the monopolist does not offer a free sample. The next proposition describes the optimal 
monopoly profit and prices in the cases where the consumer buys the product immediately when 
no free sample is offered, or buys the product after sampling. 
Proposition 2: (Monopoly pricing and profit) Assume that the demand is non-empty θH >c(1-
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* K >1 when a free sample is offered; otherwise when no free sample is offered, substitute   
and 
* K=  1
Nc γ = 0 in these expressions. 
 
Proof: See Appendix A, general Cases 1 and 2. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal price and profit are functions of standard economic 
variables such as the consumers’ discount rate, the marginal cost of producing copies of the 
product and the highest and lowest reservation prices in the population. Note that the monopoly 
profit and price are also increasing functions of the variable K*, which plays a key role in the 
analysis. In the case where a free sample is offered, K* represents the incremental utility effect 
  16generated by the sample, which pushes consumers to buy the commercial product. It is a function 
of the optimal proportion of features s* and trial time t*. On the other hand, when no free sample 
is distributed, the value of K* = 1. 
For example, take the case of an innovative product. Offering a free sample may 
simultaneously enhance sales as well as cannibalization of sales. The value of K* satisfies K*>1 
when the former effect dominates. The monopolist charges a higher price because he anticipates 
that the product becomes more attractive since the consumer tries the sample. This, in turn 









Appendix A). The reason is that learning raises the reservation prices above the buying threshold 
for a segment of consumers, who otherwise would not have bought the product. Thus, even 
though there is greater incentive to reinstall the sample of an innovative product, sales expansion 
is wins over cannibalization when K*>1. 
Proposition 3: (No free sample is offered) Assume the monopolist is impatient (δm small), that 
parameters A and α are small, s0 and/or t0 is close to 1 and the reinstallation cost is low (d large). 
It is always optimal for the monopolist not to offer a free sample. 
 
Proof: See appendix A, Case 2. 
This proposition illustrates the boundary case where it is not advantageous for the monopolist to 
offer a free sample. Although the monopolist can sell the product, offering a sample would be 
detrimental. The conditions that lead to this outcome are that the sample would not be novel 
enough, that the minimal proportion of features has to be large, and reinstallation would be too 
easy. These conditions, contribute to either making learning inconsequential, or to drive all 
consumers toward reinstalling the sample, resulting in a loss for the monopolist. 
  17The next three propositions analyze the optimal mix of proportion of features and trial time 
which are to be included in a free sample. We assume that the monopolist is patient enough (δm 
large enough), to rule out the trivial case where no sample would be offered over the entire 
parameter space. These propositions are formulated based on the software classification scheme 
developed in the previous section. These propositions provide direct managerial insights into the 
design of each category of software samples.
19
Proposition 4: (Non-durable free sample) Irrespective of the parameter values for A, α, s0 and t0, 
it is always optimal for the monopolist to offer a free sample with full features, when the 
reinstallation cost is infinite (d near zero). 
 
Proof: See appendix A, Case 1.1. 
This proposition deals with the simplest case of non-durable software samples. When the 
monopolist can fully prevent reinstallation of free software samples, it is trivial to show that the 
sample should include 100% of the features present in the commercial version. We will examine 
later the types of software for which non-durable free samples are offered. In these cases, human 
monitoring arises as a natural means of preventing unauthorized reinstallation of free samples. 
These software products are typically sold in small and specialized markets with direct and 
personalized vendor-customer relationships. 
Proposition 5: In the case of conventional (A small) software, optimal free sample design is 
characterized by the following: 
 
i) For  low-intensity modular software, a free sample should have  = s
* s 0 and  = 1, no 
matter how easy it is to reinstall the sample. 
* t
ii)  No free sample should be offered for low-intensity integrated software. 
iii) For  high-intensity software, a free sample should have  =  t
* t 0 only when the 
reinstallation cost is significant (d small). Otherwise, no free sample should be given. 
                                                           
19 It is also important to note that as shown in Appendix A (Case 1), the local optima (trial time and proportion of 
features) are independent of both the consumer’s and the monopolist’s discount rates, since in our framework profit 
maximization amounts to maximizing static consumer demand. However, the monopolist’s discount rate does play a 
role in determining the global optimum (conclusion of Case 2). 
  18iv) a)  For  high-intensity modular software, a free sample should have  = 1 only when d 
is small, otherwise  = s
* s
* s 0; whereas b) a high-intensity integrated software should 
have a sample with  = s
* s 0. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix A: i) corresponds to Case 1.4; ii) corresponds to Case 2; iii) corresponds to 
Cases 1.2 and 1.3; iv) a) is Cases 1.3 and 1.4 and b) is Case 1.2. QED 
Proposition 5 analyzes the design of free samples for various types of software according to 
our classification scheme, with a special focus on conventional software. Interestingly, this 
proposition is supported by actual marketing practices of several software products. For 
example, case i) applies to spreadsheet and drawing/painting software and states that for these 
products a free sample should include the minimum proportion of features and the maximum 
evaluation period. Real world examples are the Paintshop Pro evaluation copy and MS-Works. 
MS-Works is offered as part of Windows based PCs’ basic software package. It has no time 
restriction but offers limited features as compared to MS-Excel. 
Case ii) is relevant to word processors, standard business accounting or database software, 
and states that no free samples should be offered for these products, as observed from industry 
practice.
20 As can be seen from cases iii) and iv) the proportion of features plays a prominent 
role in the design of the free samples for high intensity software. While trial time is capped at the 
minimum, the proportion of features varies for each sub-category of high-intensity software. For 
instance, case iii) holds for music creation, utilities and engineering software. Case iv) a) holds 
for statistics/optimization software, b) CAD or tax software. In the case of CAD software, it 
appears that giving a 30-day trial period is an industry norm. A 30-day trial period is at the low 
end of the spectrum of standard evaluation periods. 
Proposition 6: In the case of novel (A large) software, optimal free sample design is 
characterized by the following: 
                                                           
20 Obviously there are other circumstances when free samples should not be given. Case 2 in Appendix A shows 
that this could happen if the cost of distribution is significant and the monopolist is impatient. 
  19 
i)  No free sample should be given in the case of integrated complex software, unless the 
sample is hard to reinstall (d close to 0). 
ii)  Low-intensity software should offer free samples with  = s
* s 0, except for case i). 
iii) a)  For  low-intensity modular software, a free sample should have  = 1, while b) low-
intensity integrated software samples should have  = 1 when d is small, and t
* t
* t 0< <1 
otherwise. 
* t
iv) For  high-intensity software, a free sample should have  = t
* t 0, no matter the value for 
d, and should have   = 1 when d is small, and s
* s 0< <1 otherwise. 
* s
v) For  high-intensity software, everything being equal, basic products should have 
samples with larger values of   as compared to samples of complex products. 
* s
 
Proof: See Appendix A: i) corresponds to Case 2; ii) corresponds to Case 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 
combined; iii) a) corresponds to Case 1.4 and b) to Cases 1.4 and 1.6 combined; iv) is Case 1.2, 
1.3 and 1.5 combined; v) follows from comparative statics on equation (7) in Appendix A. QED 
Proposition 6 offers insights into the optimal design of free samples for novel software. Case 
i) applies to B2B markets such as industrial software, for example supply chain management or 
plant software products. There is good evidence to indicate that these integrated and complex 
software products have highly technical and specialized niche markets, compared to other 
products. In these markets, the issue of unauthorized reinstallation may not be as chronic, since a 
vendor will distribute free samples to a closely monitored clientele. This monitoring reduces the 
likelihood of breaking evaluation period agreements. Thus by nature, we should expect the 
parameter d to be close to zero, in these markets. Hence, in conjunction with Proposition 4, these 
software types should also offer 100% of the products features. 
Previously in Proposition 5, we found that no free samples were given for low intensity 
integrated software. On the other hand, in Proposition 6 cases ii) and iii) show that free samples 
should be offered for this type of software unless it is complex and/or easy to reinstall. Since 
these products are novel, they benefit from a greater ‘wow’ effect produced by the sample. It is 
then crucial to restrict the other dimensions that would make reinstallation attractive. This is 
done by offering the minimum proportion of features, and further shrinking the evaluation period 
  20the more integrated the product is. Case ii) is relevant for multilevel games and photo editing 
software. Case iii) a) holds for web fulfillment software which should offer the maximum trial 
time versus b) that applies to website design software, where trial time may be more limited. In 
the case of web fulfillment shareware, it appears that a common practice is to restrict the number 
of uses or launches. Interestingly, this strategy amounts to giving a large trial time since users 
may try the shareware over several months. 
In case iv), and contrary to Proposition 5, we see that offering free samples for high-intensity 
products occurs as a rule. This case holds for educational and antivirus software, which should 
offer the minimum trial time and a smaller proportion of features the easier it is to reinstall the 
sample. Case v) shows for example that a basic software sample geared to stock market 
education should offer a larger proportion of features as compared to a stock-trading software 
sample, which is more complex. 
Interestingly, for novel software the proposition draws a sharp contrast between low-intensity 
vs. high-intensity software. Cases ii), iii) and iv) reveal that trial time is the key strategic variable 
for low-intensity software, whereas proportion of features is the key variable for high intensity 
software. The chief reason is simply that the impact of varying the proportion of features is small 
for low-intensity vis-a-vis high-intensity software samples. Overall, Propositions 5 and 6 not 
only confirm current marketing practices for various types of software; they also offer normative 
advice for any new software product that may fall into one of the categories of our classification 
scheme. 
  21V. Multi-Period Learning and Sample Reinstallation 
Software companies go to great lengths to deter or at least monitor free sample reinstallation. 
Some producers require online registration and can, to some extent, control the re-use of their 
free sample. In this section, we show that when consumers’ learning occurs over multiple 
periods, extending the initial evaluation period while completely preventing reinstallation 
thereafter may actually harm the monopolist.
21
In general, it is clear that giving a short initial evaluation period is good business practice 
since everything else being equal; a software company would rather generate revenues sooner 
than later. The initial trial time is a useful device to coax the consumer into making a decision 
whether to buy or not. Still, some consumers may feel that they did not have enough time to fully 
learn about the product at the end of the initial evaluation period. In that instance, it would 
appear that extending the length of the evaluation period is a natural way of resolving this issue. 
However, giving a longer initial trial time may not be the right action to take, since in doing so 
the monopolist may delay sales revenues from consumers who were willing to buy the product at 
an earlier point.
22
In this section, we model a simple version of this issue. For tractability of the analysis, we 
study the impact of changing the maximum trial period on the monopolist’s profit.
23 We still 
focus on the case where reinstallation is exogenous and costly to consumers. However, we now 
                                                           
21 The concept of multi-period learning may seem misleading at first, since a ‘period’ can be arbitrarily defined to fit 
any length necessary. However, the choice of the industry standard regarding the maximum evaluation period must 
be determined in part by how long it takes consumers on average to learn about the product. In addition, a 
monopolist may choose to extend the evaluation period to expand demand, when for example there is a wide 
dispersion of learning abilities in the consumer population. 
22 However, this loss may itself be mitigated, when for example, the monopolist is able to prevent further 
reinstallation of the sample. 
23 We still assume here that the consumer will only buy at the end of a game period (maximum industry standard), 
rather than at the end of trial time. In that instance, the monopolist profits are always occurring at the end of the 
game period. Thus, a delay in collecting revenues is possible, but it only depends on the maximum trial duration. 
  22posit that incremental learning may take place over two unitary periods instead of a single 
period. This enables us to show that there are particular types of software for which a monopolist 
gains more by not completely deterring shareware reinstallation, rather than extending the initial 
trial period and preclude reinstallation. 
The basic model is modified as follows. The game period (or maximum trial period) is now 
denoted by T >0. We consider two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, the game period is of 
unitary length as before, i.e. T = 1. However, the consumer’s learning accretes over two periods 
and is represented by a new learning function L1: 
1, when s<s0 or t<t0 
L1 =  V, when s0≤ s≤ 1 and t0≤ t≤ 1 over period 1. 
λ V, when s0≤ s≤ 1 and t0≤ t≤ 1 for all subsequent periods, 
The function L1 is a modified version of the learning function V that was introduced in the 
basic model. The parameter λ >1 represents the effect of accretive learning. A justification for 
that effect is that consumers can now extract more information after having familiarized 
themselves with the sample in the first period. Essentially, it is a form of learning-by-doing. We 
assume that incremental learning stops beyond period 2, so that a consumer’s updated valuation 
of the product remains capped at the same level in subsequent periods. 
In the second scenario, we assume that the maximum trial time is extended to T ∈ [1,2], and 
the monopolist only gives one period of length T for consumers to learn about the product before 
buying. In that case, the learning function becomes L2 = 
1 T λ
− V for one-period. We also assume 
that the sample cannot be reinstalled after that, so that the parameter d = 0.
24 The basic idea is to 
contrast two scenarios: 1) where multiple reinstallations of the sample are possible with greater 
  23learning as the outcome and 2) where the maximum evaluation period may be expanded but 
reinstallation is impossible. Figure 2 illustrates the two time lines corresponding to each 
scenario. 
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Proposition 7: (Monopoly pricing and profit) Assume that the demand is non-empty θH >c(1-
δ)/δ; then the optimal monopoly price and profit are: 
*
* H K θ
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−− −δ ⎡ ⎤ Π= × × × − × ⎢ ⎥ −− − − ⎣ ⎦
-F- Nγc, in the case of 
scenario 1 where reinstallation is allowed. In the case of extended trial time without 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Implicitly, we are assuming that a monopolist can prevent 100% reinstallation at a zero fixed cost, via human 
monitoring for example. 
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Proof: See Appendix B, general Cases 1 and 2. 
 
Note that with multi-period learning, in both scenarios 1 and 2, the price the monopolist is 
charging and its profit are both increasing functions of the learning parameter λ. In other words, 
the more effective prolonged learning is, the more valuable the product becomes for the 
consumer, since she gets the most information out of the trial time. The next proposition 
compares the two scenarios and gives parameter ranges for which one scenario may dominate 
the other from the monopolist’s standpoint. 
Proposition 8: For any feasible combination of parameters (A, d, α,  , δ, δ 0 t m, λ), there exists a 
corresponding threshold trial period T ∈[1,2], such that: 
 
i)  Let incremental learning be small (λ close to 1), and the sample is easy to reinstall (d 
large). The monopolist is better off giving a free sample with s0  ≤   
* s ≤ 1 and t0  ≤ 
* t ≤  1 and possible reinstallations of unitary length, rather than precluding 
reinstallation and extending the maximum trial period beyond T  (when T < 2); and 
vice versa for trial periods below T . The threshold value T  rises when the values of 
A, α,   and   are larger, and δ 0 s 0 t m is smaller. Highly novel software have T = 2. 
ii)  Let incremental learning be substantial (λ large), and the sample is hard to reinstall (d 
small). The monopolist is better off precluding reinstallation and extending the 
maximum trial period beyond T  (when T < 2) rather than giving a free sample with 
possible reinstallations of unitary length; and vice versa for trial periods below T . 
The threshold value T  drops when the values of A, α,   and   are larger, and δ and 
δ
0 s 0 t
m are smaller. Very novel software have T = 1. 
 
Proof: See Appendix B: Case 2. QED 
This last proposition offers important insights on the need for the monopolist to minimize 
reinstallation of free software sample. Proposition 8 features cases where reinstalling a free 
  25sample may turn out to be a desirable property from the monopolist’s standpoint.
25 Case i) states 
that when incremental learning is low and the software is conventional/basic/modular, the 
monopolist should maintain a unitary length for the maximum evaluation period and not 
preclude reinstallation. In contrast, if the monopolist were to extend the evaluation period past 
T  and fully preclude reinstallation, he would then postpone potential revenues that could have 
been received at the end of the unitary trial period. Furthermore, due to the low incremental 
learning, the additional revenues generated by an extension of the trial time would be insufficient 
to compensate for the postponement of the original revenues. Obviously, this outcome arises 
even more naturally when the monopolist is impatient (δm relatively small). 
On the other hand, case ii) states that, when the product is novel/complex/integrated/high-
intensity and has a short life cycle, it is sensible for the monopolist to extend the initial 
evaluation period beyond T  and fully prevent reinstallation. This is true when incremental 
learning is high. Since reinstallation is assumed hard, extending the evaluation period beyond T  
is a better means of rendering learning more effective. This generates greater revenues as 
compared with the case where reinstallation is allowed. As the monopolist become more 
impatient and the product more innovative and complex/integrated/high-intensity, it is not 
necessary to extend the trial period much beyond the unitary period. 
In general, given that the observed majority of evaluation periods for shareware are from one 
to three months, we should expect the discount rate for both monopolist and consumers to be 
fairly close to one, based on that short time span. In that case, Proposition 8 points to scenario 2 
of no reinstallation as the best option for the monopolist. 
                                                           
25 The proof in Appendix B assumes that consumers cannot buy beyond period 2. Given the nature of scenario 1), 
the optimal solutions for trial time and proportion of features remain identical as in the basic model. 
  26Notwithstanding the above discussion, it is clear that the overall best-case scenario for the 
monopolist is to allow reinstallation only so far as to capture the full effect of learning, and then 
stop the reinstallation process from that point on. Our reinstallation scenario 1 is justifiable when 
there is uncertainty about the dispersion of learning speed/abilities in the population, and more 
importantly, when the cost of enforcing the evaluation agreement is large, as may be the case for 
mass consumer software markets. Indeed integrating this fixed cost in our analysis would have 
made the outcome of scenario 1 of sample reinstallation even stronger. 
VI. Conclusions 
One common approach used to market software products is to offer free samples or shareware. 
However, the design of shareware is a non-trivial task when the sample can potentially 
cannibalize the sales of the original product. We introduce a new software classification scheme 
according to shareware characteristics that help assess the complexity of use and novelty of the 
product among other properties. For each type of software, we identify the optimal combination 
of trial time and proportion of features that should be included in the free samples. Our 
theoretical results match the practices followed by a wide array of software vendors, who use 
free samples as a marketing tool. These results can also serve as a normative guide for the design 
of new shareware. 
Furthermore, we show that when consumers’ learning is progressive, it may be beneficial for 
the monopolist not to deter reinstallation to capture a new fringe of customers while still 
obtaining revenues from customers who were willing to buy the commercial product early on. 
For software products that are conventional, basic and modular, this strategy is better than 
extending the trial time and preclude reinstallation, which would delay revenues from all buyers. 
  27On the other hand, it makes sense for the monopolist to fully prevent reinstallation for novel and 
complex products and to extend the trial time duration to facilitate greater learning. 
In this version of our model, trial time and proportion of features were considered substitutes 
in the learning process. Future research will examine the case of trial time and proportion of 
features being complements. Complementarity means that more features and more trial time 
given together tend to enhance sales. Studying the case of features that are more or less desirable 
for a segment of the population, and where learning may have an adverse impact on sales could 
also add a new twist to our model. Finally, analyzing the impact of simultaneously having an old 
and new generation of products, and/or relaxing the monopolistic framework are other logical 
avenues for extensions of our model. 
  28Appendix A: Basic Model Proofs 
 
Below, we analyze the Subgame Perfect equilibria of the basic game. Using Proposition 1 we 
can rule out as an equilibrium the case where a monopolist would offer a free sample and 
consumers decline using the free sample and buy the product right away. One interesting insight 
from this proposition is that the payoff to the consumer from buying without receiving a sample 
or buying while declining to use the free sample must be the same.  
CASE 1 (A free sample is offered) The solution ( ) is such that s
* s,
* t 0 ≤   
* s ≤ 1 and t0 ≤ 
* t ≤ 1. 
By backward induction, the consumers who use the sample and then buy (B) must have their 
payoffs satisfy: (1) δU-δP+δ
2θV/(1-δ)> δU+dUVδ
2/(1-δ) (Sampling and Buy > Sampling and 
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0. The demand function is given by D(P, t, s) = N[1- Ψ ((1-δ)P/δK)]. 
The monopolist’s profit is Π1 = D(P, t, s)×[P-c]-F-Nγc. The optimal solution for the price 
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To insure that any demand exists, we check that θH >(1-δ) /δ
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>  when 
* K >1; where the variable 
* K  represents the function K(·) evaluated at the 
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The optimal proportion of features   is given by the following necessary first order 
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Since fixed costs are assumed independent of the sample’s actual values for s and t, our 
(local) optimal proportion of features and optimal trial time are determined at the margin by 
maximizing static demand. Maximizing demand in our framework translates into maximizing the 
  30function K(·), which pins down the trade-off between the impact of learning on the desirability 
of purchasing the product vs. the attractiveness of sample reinstallation. 
Thus, our solutions are maximizing the function K(·) given the parameter values. Regarding 
interior solutions, a series of simple algebraic manipulations respectively using (4b) and (6b) 





























  (8)  
It is important to note that the proportion of features   and the trial time   cannot jointly be 
interior solutions at the same time, since we can easily show that the Hessian is not negative 
semi-definite at the point (
* s
* t
s ,t ). In fact, the pair (s ,t ) represents a saddle point solution in the 
feasible space. 
CASE 1.1 ( ) = (1, 1) will be true if (4c) and (6c) hold. 
* s,
* t
It is easy to see that (4c) is equivalent to 1< (1) s  and (6c) is equivalent to 1<  (1) t . These two 
conditions will be satisfied when d is close to zero (reinstallation cost is infinite). 
CASE 1.2 ( ) = (s
* s,
* t 0, t0) will be true if (4a) and (6a) hold. 
Both conditions are equivalent to having s0> 0 () st and  t0> 0 () ts .  These conditions will be 
satisfied even when d is large (reinstallation cost is low) but not arbitrarily close to 1;  α is in a 
compact range (not too close to either 0 or 1); and some or all of the following hold: A, s0 and t0 
are large. Moreover, when A is small then α must be large, and vice versa. 
CASE 1.3: ( ) = (1, t
* s,
* t 0) will be true if (4c) and (6a) hold. 
  31These conditions are equivalent to 1< 0 () st and  t0> (1) t  as well as (1-α)(1+t0)< α. These 
conditions are satisfied if α is large, t0 and d small; and both A and s0 are either large or small in 
tandem (d must be close to 0 when A and s0 are both small). The conditions A and s0 being either 
large or small together insure that K(1, t0) Max{K( );   ≥
* s,
* t
* s ∈ {s0 , s , 1};   {t
* t ∈ 0 , t , 1}}. 
CASE 1.4: ( ) = (s
* s,
* t 0, 1) will be true if (4a) and (6c) hold.  
These conditions are equivalent to s0>  (1) s and 1<  0 () ts  implying 2(1-α)> αs0. These 
conditions are satisfied when α and s0 are small. A higher value for A will make the condition on 
α less binding. 
CASE 1.5: ( ) = (
* s,
* t s , t0) will be true if (4b) and (6a) hold. The latter condition is equivalent 
to t0> () ts and both conditions imply that (1-α)(1+t0)< αs . This will be true when α and A are 
large and s0 and d are small. The condition s0 small is necessary otherwise, case 1.2 would 
dominate. 
CASE 1.6: ( ) = (s
* s,
* t 0, t ) will be true if (4a) and (6b) hold. The first condition is equivalent to 
s0> () st  and both conditions imply (1-α)(1+t )> αs0. This is true when α is small, A and s0 are 
large and d is large enough. 
CASE 1.7: (Not a solution) ( ) = (
* s,
* t s , 1) will be true if (4b) and (6c) hold. This pair cannot 
be a solution. The latter condition is equivalent to  () ts>1 and both conditions imply that (1-
α)(1+t0)>αs  which will be true if α is small, A and t0 large, with d not too small. This solution 
is dominated by (s0,  ) with   {t
* t
* t ∈ 0 ,  t , 1}. The idea being that if A is large and α is small, 
reducing the sample features does not reduce its marketing power, while at the same time it 
prevents sample re-use. 
  32CASE 1.8: (Not a solution) ( ) = (1, 
* s,
* t t ) will be true if (4c) and (6b) hold. Again, this pair 
cannot be a solution. The first condition is equivalent to  () st >1 and both conditions imply that 
(1-α)(1+t )< α; which will be true if α and A are large and d small. This solution is dominated 
by picking ( ,  t
* s 0) with   ∈ {s
* s 0, s , 1}. The idea being that if α is large, trial time plays a minor 
role, and hence reducing it does not lower the attractiveness of the product since A is large. 
 
CASE 2) No Free Sample is Given: 
Assume that the monopolist strategy space is limited to picking a proportion of features s<s0.  
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⎟ takes values in the interval [0,1]. It is easy to see that the demand D(P, t, s) is 
decreasing in s and t. By not distributing a free sample, the monopolist is also not incurring the 
cost Nγc of making and distributing copies of the sample. Thus, the optimal response for the 
monopolist is to set   and  = 0. Moreover, the standard first order condition for selecting the 
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We need to check that selecting   and  = 0 is optimal over the global strategy space. This will 






1 Π  where   is the maximum profit generated in CASE 1. It is easy to 






1 Π  when γ large, δm small and K
*< 1. The latter will be true when the 
learning parameter A is small and/or s0 is close to 1, and/or t0 is close to 1, and/or the 
reinstallation cost is low (d large), and/or α is small. Otherwise, the solutions s0 ≤ 
* s ≤ 1 and t0 
  33≤ 
* t ≤ 1 explored in CASE 1) are optimal over the global strategy space, i.e. including selecting 
s<s0 and t<t0, under contrary assumptions.        Q E D  
 
Appendix B: Multi-Period Learning Proofs 
 
CASE 1 (2-period learning): We assume that in addition to the strategies that were available 
before, consumers can also buy the product in period 2; but not beyond that period. Below, we 
analyze the equilibrium where two sequential market demands co-exit with one segment of 
consumers who prefer buying at the end of period 1, and another segment who will buy after two 
periods. 
Subcase 1.1 the solution ( ) is such that s
* s,
* t 0 ≤ 
* s ≤  1 and t0 ≤ 
* t ≤ 1. 
To keep the notations lighter we examine the consumers payoffs from the standpoint of present 
values at the end of period 1 (after sampling), and not the beginning of stage 1 as was done in the 
basic model. By backward induction, the consumers who will use the sample and then buy (B) at 
end of period 1 must have their payoffs satisfy the following conditions; given that learning 
occurs according to the learning function L1:  
(1) U-P+ δθV+δ
2θλV/(1-δ) > U+δdUV+δ
2dUλV/(1-δ) (Buy at end period 1> Not-Buy) 
(2) U-P+ δθV+δ
2θλV/(1-δ) > U-δP+ δdUV +δ
2θλV/(1-δ) (Buy at end period 1> Buy at end of 
period 2) 
By backward induction, consumers who will use the sample and then buy (B) at end of period 2 
must have their payoffs satisfy: 
(3) U-δP+ δdUV +δ
2θλV/(1-δ) > U+δdUV+δ
2dUλV/(1-δ) (Buy at end period 2> Not-Buy) 
  34Note that conditions (2) and (3) imply condition (1). 









= ; where K(·) is defined as before in the basic 









= . It is easy to show that  2 θ > 1 θ  since λ>1. 
More importantly, the segment of consumers that satisfy θ > 2 θ  will buy at the end of period 1, 
and the segment of consumers satisfying  2 θ > θ > 1 θ , will buy in the second period. The demand 
from consumers buying in period 1 is D1(P,  t,  s)=N[1-  Ψ( 2 θ )]. The residual demand from 
consumers buying in period 2 is D2(P, t, s)=N[Ψ( 2 θ )-Ψ( 1 θ )]. The monopolist’s profit (valued at 
end of period 1) is Π = [D1+δmD2] × [P-c]-F-Nγc; which is the present value of profits obtained 
from the total demand.  Let us denote the total demand by D =[D1+δmD2]. The optimal solution 










Solving equation (9) leads to: 
 
*
* H K θ







  (10) 






(1 ) NK ( 1 )
θ




δλ δ λ λ δ
−− −δ ⎡ ⎤ Π= × × × − × ⎢ ⎥ −− − − ⎣ ⎦
-F- Nγc.  
Just as was done in Appendix A, it is straightforward to show that maximizing the profit function 
is equivalent to maximizing the function K(·) with respect to trial time and proportion of 
features. Therefore, the solutions ( ) are the same as the ones described in Appendix A. 
* s,
* t
  35Subcase 1.2 the solution ( ) is such that  <s
* s,
* t
* s 0 and  <t
* t 0. This sub-case is the same as in 
Appendix A. 
 
CASE 2 (One-period learning; no reinstallation possible): Since the sample is essentially non-
durable it is straightforward to show that the optimal solution ( ) =(1,T). The consumers that 





T)>U; since no reinstallation is possible; and 
given that learning occurs according to the learning function L2;  where 
















,  (11) 
Again, given the assumption that completely preventing the unauthorized reinstallation of free 
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3 Π . This 
is true when the following sufficient condition holds: 
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A solution T  exists if the RHS of (12) is monotonic in T, and under other conditions on the 
parameters defined below. Thus (12) is equivalent to: 

































∂⎜⎟ − ⎝ <
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⎠ . It is easy to check that this latter derivative being negative is 
implied by λ close to 1. Moreover, these conditions with δm small and d large are also sufficient 
for the value of 
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 to be contained in the interval of minimum and maximum 










. Furthermore, basic comparative statics on equation (13) 
reveals that T  must be increasing in A, α,  ,  ; since d is assumed large. However, the effect 
of raising the discount rate δ on 
0 s 0 t
T  is ambiguous. 











∂⎜⎟ − ⎝ >
∂
⎠ , implies that CASE 1 will be favored when T (A, d, α, 
, δ, δ 0 t m, λ) ≥ T. It is easy to check that this latter derivative being positive is implied by λ large. 
Moreover, these conditions with δm small and d small are also sufficient for the value of 
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. The comparative statics from (13) follows from the same argument as 
before. It shows that T  must be decreasing in A, α,   and  , and increasing in δ; especially 
when d is assumed small.  QED 
0 s 0 t
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